Is population growth conducive to the sustainability of cooperation?

This paper asks whether population growth is conducive to the sustainability of cooperation. A simple model is developed in which farmers who live around a circular lake engage in trade with their adjacent neighbors. The payoffs from this activity are governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” Every farmer has one son when the population is not growing, or two sons when it is growing. In the former case, the son takes over the farm when his father dies. In the latter case, one son stays on his father’s farm, whereas the other son settles around another lake, along with the “other” sons of the other farmers. During his childhood, each son observes the strategies and the payoffs of his father and of the trading partners of his father, and imitates the most successful strategy when starting farming on his own. Then mutant defectors are introduced into an all-cooperator community. The defector strategy may spread. A comparison is drawn between the impact in terms of the sustainability of cooperation of the appearance of the mutants in a population that is not growing, and in one that is growing. It is shown that the ex-ante probability of sustaining the cooperation strategy is higher for a community that is growing than for a stagnant community.Population growth, Imitation, Sustainability of cooperation, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Farm Management, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Land Economics/Use, Production Economics, Productivity Analysis, C72, D01, D83, J19, J62, R12, R23,

Is population growth conducive to the sustainability of cooperation?

This paper asks whether population growth is conducive to the sustainability of cooperation. A simple model is developed in which farmers who live around a circular lake engage in trade with their adjacent neighbors. The payoffs from this activity are governed by a prisoner's dilemma rule of engagement. Every farmer has one son when the population is not growing, or two sons when it is growing. In the former case, the son takes over the farm when his father dies. In the latter case, one son stays on his father's farm, whereas the other son settles around another lake, along with the other sons of the other farmers. During his childhood, each son observes the strategies and the payoffs of his father and of the trading partners of his father, and imitates the most successful strategy when starting farming on his own. Then mutant defectors are introduced into an all-cooperator community. The defector strategy may spread. A comparison is drawn between the impact in terms of the sustainability of cooperation of the appearance of the mutants in a population that is not growing, and in one that is growing. It is shown that the ex-ante probability of sustaining the cooperation strategy is higher for a community that is growing than for a stagnant community. --Population growth,Imitation,Sustainability of cooperation

A concern about low relative income, and the alignment of utilitarianism with egalitarianism

A utilitarian social planner who maximizes social welfare assigns the available income to those who are most efficient in converting income into utility. However, when individuals are concerned about their income falling behind the incomes of others, the optimal income distribution under utilitarianism is equality of incomes.Utilitarianism, Income equality, Social welfare maximization, Relative income, Labor and Human Capital, H0, I0, I30, I31,

The merger of populations, the incidence of marriages, and aggregate unhappiness

Let a society’s unhappiness be measured by the aggregate of the levels of relative deprivation of its members. When two societies of equal size, F and M, merge, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be higher than the sum of the levels of unhappiness in the constituent societies when apart; merger alone increases unhappiness. But when societies F and M merge and marriages are formed such that the number of households in the merged society is equal to the number of individuals in one of the constituent societies, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be lower than the aggregate unhappiness in the two constituent societies when apart. This result obtains regardless of which individuals from one society form households with which individuals from the other, and even when the marriages have not (or not yet) led to income gains to the married couples from increased efficiency, scale economies, and the like. While there are various psychological reasons for people to become happier when they get married as opposed to staying single, the very formation of households reduces social distress even before any other happiness-generating factors kick in.Merger of populations, Integration of societies, Unhappiness, Marriages, Relative deprivation, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, D0, D10, D31, D63,

The merger of populations, the incidence of marriages, and aggregate unhappiness

Let a society's unhappiness be measured by the aggregate of the levels of relative deprivation of its members. When two societies of equal size, F and M, merge, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be higher than the sum of the levels of unhappiness in the constituent societies when apart; merger alone increases unhappiness. But when societies F and M merge and marriages are formed such that the number of households in the merged society is equal to the number of individuals in one of the constituent societies, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be lower than the aggregate unhappiness in the two constituent societies when apart. This result obtains regardless of which individuals from one society form households with which individuals from the other, and even when the marriages have not (or not yet) led to income gains to the married couples from increased efficiency, scale economies, and the like. While there are various psychological reasons for people to become happier when they get married as opposed to staying single, the very formation of households reduces social distress even before any other happiness-generating factors kick in. --Merger of populations,Integration of societies,Unhappiness,Marriages,Relative Deprivation

Market Coupling as the Universal Algorithm to Assess Zonal Divisions

Adopting a zonal structure of electricity market requires specification of zones' borders. In this paper we use social welfare as the measure to assess quality of various zonal divisions. The social welfare is calculated by Market Coupling algorithm. The analyzed divisions are found by the usage of extended Locational Marginal Prices (LMP) methodology presented in paper [1], which takes into account variable weather conditions. The offered method of assessment of a proposed division of market into zones is however not limited to LMP approach but can evaluate the social welfare of divisions obtained by any methodology.Comment: 5 page

A methodological rejoinder to "Does income relate to health due to psychosocial or material factors?"

There is a presumption that when an individual’s comparison of his income with the incomes of others in his comparison group yields an unfavorable outcome, the individual is dismayed and experiences stress that impinges negatively on his health. In a recent study, Hounkpatin et al. (2016) conduct an inquiry aimed at deciphering which measure of low relative income reflects better the adverse psychosocial effect of low relative income on health. Hounkpatin et al. pit against each other two indices that they characterize as “competing:” the “relative deprivation (Yitzhaki Index)” of individual i, RD(i); and the “income rank position” of individual i, R(i). In this Rejoinder we show that because a measure of rank is embodied in the RD(i) index and the R(i) index can be elicited from the RD(i) index, these two indices need not be viewed as competing. Furthermore, we formulate a composite measure of relative deprivation, CRD(i), which can be used to assess more fully the psychosocial effect of individual i’s low relative income on his health